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Abstract Resumen
As a social construction, (bio)technology1 should not be 
studied out of the social field. From a Social Imaginaries 
approach,  (bio)technology  can  be  considered  as  a 
contemporary  social  magma  formed  by  biological, 
technical,  psychological,  sociological  and  axiological 
factors. Orbiting around the the cyborg metaphor, in this 
article we intend to build a multidisciplinary approach of 
this polycontexture. 
Como  una  construcción  social,  la  (bio)tecnología  no  
debe ser estudiada fuera del campo social. Desde una  
perspectiva analítica sobre los imaginarios sociales, la  
(bio)tecnología  puede  ser  considerada  como  un 
magma  social  formado  por  factores  biológicos,  
técnicos,  psicológicos,  sociológicos  y  axiológicos.  
Orbitando alrededor de la metáfora del cyborg, en este  
artículo  nos  proponemos  construir  un  enfoque 
multidisciplinar de esta polycontextura. 
Keywords:  Cyborg,  Social  Imaginaries, 
(Bio)technology
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Introduction
It is not necessary to refer to scholars to affirm that western civilization tends to make a parallel between 
human and technological development. For Marxism it is even a nuclear concept to understand societies,  
their  history  and economy. The expression of  this particular relation has,  nowadays,  pretty particular  
forms,  and we will  focus on this  article  on (bio)technology,  conscious that  we are assuming quite  a 
challenge: the ‘sociological study of technology’ is far beyond being an evident matter, and it has been 
affirmed (Law, 2003) that there is not a single sociological study of technology at all2.
1 Biotechnology is a “group of techniques which make possible the use of properties from living creatures to produce 
goods and services” (Muñoz, 2001, p. 11). That is, a technology with a strong productive and economical purpose. 
Whereas, (bio)technology refers to the technologies linked to the living in a global sense and, therefore, to those 
closely linked to the human being and his transformation. For this reason, (bio)technology is not circumscribed to the 
attainment of goods and services; the transformation itself of our body can be included in this concept. For instance, 
genetic engineering is not considered as part of biotechnology, in spite of the clear, deep and technological change of 
life it implies.
2 In terms of society-biotechnology relations, it would be interesting to have something else than just  satisfactory, 
ambivalent or controversial (cf. Muñoz, 2001).
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It is probably too soon to measure the influence of modern (bio)technology3 in the processes of identity, 
personal and collective building (Broncano, 2006, p. 24). Although, what is already common, is to find 
factual studies about ageing and how to minimize its effects; researches on new technologies capable of  
making up for physical  disabilities (cochlear implants, pacemakers,  orthopaedics, etc);  advances with 
stem cells for a “reconstruction” of any kind of damage or pathology; improvements of the procedures and 
the achievement of materials in plastic surgery, just to mention some. 
On the light of scientific achievement and prospective, can we refrain from seeing hybrids everywhere? 
They can be found in all sort of industries: medical, biotechnologyical, pharmaceutical, aesthetical,...  Is 
this phenomenon showing something new about human societies? What are we becoming? Are humans 
becoming something better, worst or just different? It is much of evidence that we are witnessing the  
dissolution of  some traditional  distinctions like  human/non-human,  natural/artificial,  culture/technology, 
theory/praxis, content/context, macro/micro (cf. Broncano, 2006 p. 26).
Gandy (2005) had developed a relational and materially grounded reading of the cyborg, as an intrinsic  
dimension  to  the  co-evolution  of  social  and  technological  systems.  In  his  work  he  uses  the  cyborg 
metaphor as an abstract and inter-subjective realm through which political and cultural ideas become 
constituted or ‘fleshed out’. The use of such a metaphor points to the interaction between social and  
biophysical  processes;  explores  the  interface  between  technology  and  the  body;  destabilizes  the 
pervasive narratives of dematerialization, spatial malleability and virtualization; becomes, finally, a critical  
intellectual  concept  that  challenges  disembodied,  dualistic,  masculinist  and  teleological  bodies  of 
knowledge.
A cyborg is a hybrid creature, composed of organism and machine. But, cyborgs are 
compounded of special kinds of machines and special kinds of organisms appropriate to 
the late twentieth century. Cyborgs are post-Second World War hybrid entities made of, 
first, ourselves and other organic creatures in our unchosen “high-technological” guise 
as information systems,  texts,  and ergonomically  controlled  labouring,  desiring,  and 
reproducing systems. The second essential ingredient in cyborgs is machines in their 
guise, also, as communications systems, texts, and self-acting, ergonomically designed 
apparatuses (Haraway, 1991, p. 1).
Thinking  the  human  being  as  a  cyborg,  implies  first  –for  this  article  interest–  a  (bio)technological 
consideration, but –most important– it permits the confluence of many fields. Aspects such as ethics, 
politics and anthropology orbit around the possibilities of human self-transformation. In fact, the cyborg  
metaphor becomes a symbol for the militarization of society (Gandy, 2005; Gray 1997 and Der Derian, 
2001). Through the Social Imaginaries (SI) theories, the role of this social construct into the social system 
can be studied, -for example, in the main processes of constitution of welfare, youth and modern nihilism. 
Nevertheless,  such  a  study  is  not  obvious.  Cultural  meaning  fades  from  collective  consciousness,  
gradually disappearing from view as part of the ‘taken-for-granted’ world of everyday life. Questions about 
theories and methodologies make it, in the best of the cases, a new field of research. At any rate, the 
strict logics of reason does not lead studies to a conclusive and firm port, and most of the work on SI  
3 There is a confusion regarding the concept of biotechnology. In this paper, we will only consider the stage of New 
Biotechnologies  which  opens  the  possibility  to  transform the  genome,  as  well  as  other  technologies  aimed  to 
transform the human being, shaping an imaginary of self-construction of nature and of ourselves. 
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have a great debt with literature, linguistics, and specially with hermeneutics. Is it possible to determine 
the schemes of thought that sustains the Social Imaginary of the human being? 
Disassembling and reassembling different bodies of 
knowledge
When entering into the social  analysis  of  technology,  we should  ask ourselves if  we are not  simply 
rediscovering, or re-articulating, what is already clear in the practice. John Law (2003) invites researchers 
and scholars to see how the technical field is always juxtaposed, if not mixed up, with political, legal, and 
economics. 
For instance, internet is said to be one of the best communication, information and, even, emancipation 
tools,  but  the  relevance  given  to  communication  in  the  contemporary  society,  beyond  the  rising 
importance  of  mass  media,  is  a  “consequence  of  a  symbolic  array  interweaving  communication, 
technology and future and has its conceptual  origin in cybernetics and the political  reorganization of 
mercantile and managerial mentality” (Cabrera, 2006 pp. 139 and f.).
It  is  hard  to  deny  that  we  live  under  a  new  (bio)technological  paradigm  where  the  human  self-
transformation acquires an unusual importance. New sources of energy, the synthesis of new materials, 
laser  technology or  biotechnology in every social  activity,  cannot  be out  of  an impact  with notorious 
repercussions on the society (Quintanilla, 2005 & Woolgar, 1988). The natural system is “machinized” 
and the artificial environment becomes immaterial (computer networks, cyberspace, virtual reality, etc.) 
(Hottois, 1999/2003).
Although, the perception of biotechnology4 is closely linked to its stages of experimental progress: 
Biotechnology  has  experienced  different  stages,  depending  on  the  degree  of 
manipulation of the organisms used and of the products obtained. Classic technology 
designs  the  empirical  technologies  aiming,  basically  to  obtain  food  (bread,  beer, 
cheese,  wine,  etc.).  Later,  appeared  a  number  of  Technologies  to  obtain  specific 
products, such as amino acids, methanol, ethanol and, above all, antibiotics, through 
the  selection  of  natural  organisms  able  to  produce  these  compounds  in  their 
fermentative processes, or to secrete these important secondary metabolites. Theses 
technologies have been designated as modern biotechnologies. The present stage of 
New Biotechnologies is characterized by the possibility to modify the genome of human 
beings (Montoya and Murillo, 1991, p. 191).
Jeremy Rifkin (1999) talks about the century of biotechnology characterized by the activity based on first, 
isolate,  identify  and  recombine  genes  as  the  material  of  future  economic  activity;  second, 
commercialization, patents, genetic engineering; third, globalization, power and biotic resources of the 
planet; forth, possibility of a eugenic civilization driven by economy; fifth, new scientific research about the 
genetic basis of behaviour; sixth, computer and telematic means; seventh, new ideas about nature to  
legitimize the century of biotechnology. To be able to put together such factors and make them work, we 
need a special tool if not to build this construct up, at least to think about it; hence, 
4 See note 1.
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[the]  cyborg would be the central  figure of  our space-time, where the main rules of 
interpretation, assessment and localization interweave and become more visible […] at 
least, regarding the social agent. In this sense, the cyborg would be the figure which ties 
the  main  arguments  or  subjects  of  our  stories  of  identity  and  allows  materializing, 
personifying or seeing the events, tensions and conditions which outline nowadays the 
eventual social agents (García Selgas, 1999, p. 185).
The cyborg is a sophisticated creation that simultaneously extends and threatens our understanding of 
what it means to be human (Figueroa & Steven, 2002). It points on becoming ‘post human’ in order to 
liberate the human body from the illusory boundaries of the autonomous self  (Gandy, 2005). Beyond 
fantastical combinations of bodies and machines, it is a way of thinking the world. Since the mid-1980s, it  
has been used as an ontological strategy to think about what appears to reside outside conventional  
frameworks of understanding.
The cyborg is a cybernetic organism that disassembles and reassembles, at the same time, chimera and 
social  reality.  Haraway  (1991)  is  the  first  to  use  the  cyborg  as  a  metaphor  to  understand  and 
communicate women’s struggle:
A cyborg is a cybernetic organism, a hybrid of machine and organism, a creature of 
social reality as well as a creature of fiction. Social reality is lived social relations, our 
most  important  political  construction,  a  world-changing  fiction.  The  international 
women's movements have constructed 'women's experience', as well as uncovered or 
discovered this crucial collective object. This experience is a fiction and fact of the most 
crucial,  political  kind.  Liberation rests  on the construction of  the consciousness,  the 
imaginative apprehension, of oppression, and so of possibility. The cyborg is a matter of 
fiction and lived experience that changes what counts as women's experience in the late 
twentieth century.  This is a struggle over life and death,  but  the boundary between 
science fiction and social reality is an optical illusion. (Haraway, 1991, p. 149).
It is a pretty fertile exercise trying to make a dialogical reading of images in the discourse, looking for the 
schemes with which reality is apprehended and ordered. Such an activity is made on hopping to make 
this schemes become somehow visible. The metaphor as a main working tool becomes the guideline of a  
conceptual system which might not be obvious (cf. Lakoff and Johnson, 1980/1995). Metaphor is thought 
to be a poetic or rhetorical  matter,  but  it  is  pervasive in everyday’s life.  Its domain is much beyond  
language; metaphors are blueprints of thought and action:
The concepts that govern our thought are not just matters of the intellect. They also 
govern our  everyday functioning,  down to  the most  mundane details.  Our concepts 
structure what we perceive, how we get around in the world, and how we relate to other 
people.  Our  conceptual  system  thus  plays  a  central  role  in  defining  our  everyday 
realities. If we are right in suggesting that our conceptual system is largely metaphorical,  
then the way we thinks what we experience, and what we do every day is very much a 
matter of metaphor. (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980/1995, p. 25).
Associating and comparing, the metaphor shows not only the analogy between two objects or ideas; it  
speaks of difference and also of resemblance. This unlocks the possibility to perceive abstract realities in 
104
Francesca Randazzo; Juan R. Coca; Jesús A. Valero Matas
a more concrete way; then, builds a relation between dissimilar realities; and finally, makes an opened 
encounter of otherwise unreachable meanings and prospective. 
The power of creation
New skin, new arm, new born. Is this just another expression of modernity? Are we just having more of 
the same? Is the cyborg just a way to profane the traditional order? Well, ‘humanity’ and ‘technology’  
were never as simple  and monolithic as the larger  commercial  and media powers,  as well  as other  
theories, have us believed. In this sense, Fuchs (1995) suggests that the cyborg is defined by its own 
'indeterminate  self-identity'.  Indeed,  the  cyborg  further  challenges  the  heterosexual  reproductive 
narratives  of  humanism  by  presenting  a  body  that  is  'self-reproducing'  but  not  reproductive,  and 
threatening biological reproduction with mechanical reproduction (Fuchs, 1995). The fact that humankind 
has always lived in reciprocity with technologies and machines is Cooke’s (2006) basic foundment for his 
“cyborg theory”.
Even if change is always present in everyday’s life –it is not even difficult to be perceived!–, we have got  
the feeling that we live into a reality that is always the same, where social relations and power remain in 
the hand of the same groups. We think we live in a sort of system exterior to us and that it is just the way 
things are. At the other side, the “we” referred are people with silicone in their breasts, hair extensions, 
hearing  aids,  IUDs,  artificial  nails,  arterial  implants,  etc.  Becoming  what  we  are  not  –already–,  is 
somehow possible. 
This  and  other  achievements  in  the  (bio)technical  field  might  be  speaking  of  an  ancient  –almost 
archetypical– wish of  becoming Gods, or at  least  our own creators.  It  might  refer to the idea of  our 
ephemeral  civilization  adorned  with  an  echo  of  eternity.  This  new  Faustic  order  is  settled  on  the 
antagonism of values, where science comes to rescue a man that thinks to get rid of terror when there is  
nothing left unknown (Beriaín,1996, p. 51). The complexity that appeared to enlarge our choices and 
settle a new scale of possibilities might imprisons the human being inside his own creation.
The emerging ‘cyborg theory’, allows to work around the dominant ideology of the ‘human’, and there 
what  truly  matters  is  to  acknowledge  the  place  from  which  studies  are  performed.  Law  (2003) 
distinguishes the dualism in the actor network theory approach and, we should add, Luhmann’s systemic  
theory. Studies tend to reproduce and help to perform a functional understanding of the relations between 
entities.  Networks  –and systemic  theory  –  are hegemonic  and  help  to  perform it  into  being,  adding 
strength to a functional version of relationality, as part of a coherent, ordering, logic of control (cf. Law, 
2003). 
An actor-network approach describes something as it is imagined by participants in terms of systems and 
relations, as it is pretty the way of thinking in vogue. But, it does not have to be that way. It is possible to  
imagine other logics which produce different kinds of politics, and different kinds of persons that are not 
subjugated to those logics of means and ends, projects and goals.
Law (2003) insists that we live in a post-disciplinary era and, that social  science endeavours to look 
beyond disciplinary boundaries, where the social analysis of technology is no exception. Also Davis-Floyd 
and Dumit  (1998) say that  we are immersed in  cyborgs;  the saturate  our  language,  our  media,  our 
technology, and our way of being. To do so, an interdisciplinary attitude would be needed and, in spite of  
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this relatively new determination, it is not easy to find the way to make it work in social sciences. It shows 
to be, if not a real failure, a reason to redefine limits, build resistances, create new hybrids, or just point to  
the inability and inappropriateness of trying to put knowledge or different methods together. In a certain  
way, universities, publishers, and others, refuse to have social sciences cyborgs. 
A new metaphor for an old world
The possibility of change is not only exterior, but it seems sometimes hard to visualize change in more 
subtle ways. Human beings –and social relations– are in constant change too. Talking about and dealing 
with feminism, racism, social exclusion was of the order of utopia, not so far a go in spaces where it  
seems to be forgotten, especially when locking at other places. As problematic eugenic and bioethical  
issues, there are some parts of this change that can be seen, and other that not, as a relevance-opacity  
code (cf. Pintos, 2001 a).
From the current social construction of technology, there can be seen a distinction between people and  
societies on the one hand, and the world of artefacts and the natural world, on the other hand. In this way 
of thought, the social and the technical are divided. But, if making a difference is a fundamental step to 
understand and apprehend our world, living into an era where “normal” distinctions are on crisis is also a 
determinant moment for new ways of approaching knowledge. It is the case of the cyborg, although there 
are many other powerful ideas -like the man of Turing, the network paradigm and the Dedalus paradigm5.
The way in which differences are drown is what the theory of Social Imaginaries calls “relevancies” and 
“opacities” (cf. Pintos, 2001a), not only as a procedure to determine and acknowledge where lights and 
shadows are placed -as if there was a hidden conscious beneath this process- but an inner not explicit  
“imaginary”, responsible of making this difference something “normal”. A binary way of thinking is a totally  
uncritical tool, if it does not take into account that differences are generated in the relations that produce 
them; they do not just exist in the order of things. The analyst’s job is to explore those relations, and the 
question is how best we might erode those essential distinctions (Law, 2003).
The simultaneity interaction of material and imaginary perceptions is at the basis of the Social Imaginaries 
Theories6, and when talking about the cyborg, it is hard not to make a parallel: blurring of boundaries 
between the concrete and the social complexities; distinction between mind and body and between the 
material and the virtual. Social reality is somehow a tangible entity but also a relational construct, and we 
cannot disentangle the one from the other.
For Juan Luis Pintos Social Imaginaries “are being” schemes socially built, which allow us to perceive,  
explain and intervene in what every differentiated system considers as real . These imaginaries operate 
5 Manuel Garrido, talks about the man of Turing, the network paradigm and Dedalus paradigm. The first one refers to 
the computing and communication world,  pointing to the beginning of  what it  would be later known as Artificial 
Intelligence. Alan Turing (1912-1954), published in 1936 “On calculable numbers”, a paper that theorizes about an 
eventual  calculating  machine.  The  second  one,  the  network  paradigm,  signals  machines  which  simulated  “the 
behaviour  of  the  introvert  solipsist  subject  from  the  Cartesian  philosophy”  (Turing,  1936,  cited
by Garrido, 2007). Machines that could make marvellous calculations, but were unable to communicate among them, 
became able to maintain a flow of mutual information (Garrido, 2007: p. 874). The third one, the Dedalus paradigm,  
concerns the biological sciences and the implicit improvement and modification of the human being.
6 The theory of social imaginaries has been developed during the last decades by thinkers of the stature of Cornelius 
Castoriadis,  Michel Maffesoli,  Josetxo Beriaín,  Ángel E. Carretero,  Juan Luís Pintos, Emmanuel Lizcano, Esther 
Díaz, Celso Sánchez Capdequí, Manuel Baeza, etc. (cf. Coca, 2008)
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as a metacode in the socially differentiated systems, inside a specific “mean” (money, belief, power, etc.)  
belonging to each system, through the relevance/opacity code and they generate forms and ways that act  
as realities. Furthermore, they have several functions, i.e.,  producing an image of stability in changing  
social relationships, generating perceptions of continuity in discontinuous experiences, providing global  
explanations  of  fragmentary  phenomena  and  allowing  intervention  in  processes  built  under  the  
differentiated perspectives. Moreover, it can be said that they are built and rebuilt in three differentiated 
fields: in the differentiated specific system (politics, law, religion, science, etc.), in that of the organizations  
which make real the institutionalization of the system (governments, banks, churches, academies, etc)  
and in that of the interactions produced among individuals in the environment of the system. (cf. Pintos, 
1995a; 1995b; 2001a; 2001b; 2003; 2004; 2005; 2006a; 2006b). Pintos suggests a list of procedures: 
criticism of the “facts”, construction of “observables”, establish first and second order observations, and  
the use of a relevance/opacity code based on semantic references.
In spite of the affectation of the definition, this is far from being a recipe to be followed and methods are 
not always explicit. In the best of the cases, analytical discourse techniques are lent from other fields and 
maybe not always acknowledged or treated as accurately as they should, lending conclusions to be very 
closely like mere opinions (cf. Randazzo, 2010). 
Wider studies of biotechnological social imaginaries are necessary. For the moment, we can only stress 
that social sciences are depicting a scene where humanity is reflected in a peculiar way. That image 
configures our social reality too. Sometimes it is like the deforming mirrors at the circus, where some of  
us might get lost, trying to remember how we used to look like before getting in. The “traditional” human 
bio-psycho-socio-axiological  polycontexture  might  be  in  a  process  of  change  towards  a  bio-techno-
psycho-socio-axiological polycontexture.
Different versions intertwined
It is of no use to ask ourselves about the SI of biotechnology, the most public face of the becomings-
cyborg  around  us,  if  we  are  not  rising  any  serious  questioning  of  the  bio/techno  relation  and  the 
overlapping with distinct fields: 
No field within biology, when we think in the positive level (the level focused on the  
achievement  of  a  singular  product)  implies  a  certain  capacity  of  intervention.  We 
manipulate genes now, but we will manipulate genomes, cells, embryos, organs. We 
are gaining access to the understanding of the basis of the human behaviour, but we 
will  end up having a detailed map of the process of how the brain works when we 
generate  feelings  and  of  the higher  categories  of  thought,  including the process  of  
taking  decisions.  We  develop  drugs,  still  rather  generic;  however,  we  will  develop 
nanomachines or minimal  cells able to head for “the problem in order to achieve a 
possible molecular solution” (Moya, 2007, p. 228).
Cooke (2006) wonders how can we speak of what is biological when patenting living entities or elements 
as ‘inventions’, and thus technologies. We might be forgotten that the technological is a human construct,  
but can also be considered non-human, as human is strictly biological and much more than it. Practices 
and processes of technoscience are not simply a biological matter; it is a question of political or economic 
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use,  elisions  and  boundaries,  legal  apparatus  around  human,  machine,  biology  and  technology  (cf. 
Cooke, 2006).
The cyborg metaphor, as well as for SI, it is at root both a materialist concept and an idealist construct,  
which  is  not  inconsistent  with  neo-Marxian  conceptions  of  relations  between  material  and  abstract, 
offering a sense of continuity in our critical appreciation of the intersection between different and often 
contradictory modernities (for cyborg cf. Gandy, 2005). The aim for using the cyborg metaphor is to get to 
something quite other to functionalism. We are trying to avoid drawing things together and order them into  
a single vision, goal-related network. The cyborg, is more than one but less than many, elements are 
joined and separated, there is unity and multiplicity, fractional and shifting coherences.
As Law (2003) questions, is our job as researchers to represent the world as it is? Are we really trying to  
discover something important about the structures of the sociotechnical (the truth)? Or less comforting, 
are we in the process of uncritically reproducing a dominant ideology in which the current orderings of the 
world represent themselves? As the child that needs to destroy the toy to understand it, we seem to be 
trying to find each of our divine secrets, and as soon we do so, the mystery suddenly become human,  
that is to say, our own creation.
On the one hand, we seem to live in a new era ruled by the possibilities of human change, at least  
physically. On the other hand, systemic theories of society –specially Luhmann’s – are hiding the power 
of  individuals  and their  possibilities of  action and social  change.  There is  a need of  new semiotics, 
methods, and sensibilities to explore the human construction of reality and social relations. In fact, the 
women’s body has become problematic  for her seemed easier  to shrug it  off  (Haraway,  1991).  The 
cyborg is an invitation to re-write our social stories.  But this perspective is also regarded as a dystopia 
and an aggressive neoliberal form (Salleh, 2009). This will not be our case. Re-shaping our bodies might 
be a way to make visible a part of what is changing in our minds.
We need to face a vital challenge to imagine progressive and creative forms of politics, ethics, aesthetics  
and enchantments that do not rest on essential distinctions between the human and the non human but  
are instead relational. As social researchers, Law (2003) stands that we can make a description of the 
way things are, or presuppose a set of assumptions about how relations are organized in terms of power,  
strength, plausibility... Innocently enough we’re describing (right or wrong) the world and its relations or  
we are just telling stories about the world, bringing into being what we describe, while pushing others 
things out of being. We are making a difference.
The question is how to articulate the relations between different realities and different versions, and here 
the cyborg metaphor is of help. First it is a fleshy-machinic hybrid. Second, it is also a hybrid, a set of  
partial connections, between what is real and what might perhaps be performed into being – a feminist,  
non-racist,  and  non-violent,  thinking  and  performing  alternative,  sensitive  realities  and  Otherness, 
different visions, different realities, different truths, different subjectivities and different versions of the  
good – and constant displacements between these. This hybrid between science fact and science fiction, 
could be compared with the dialectics of Social Imaginaries and Social Reality.
Yet the Social Imaginaries Theories do not –for the moment– show how interdependencies of evolving  
structures are engendered and do not stress on relationships -maybe the predominant systemic approach 
has  something  to  do  with  it.  Researches  able  to  integrate  other  approaches  might  be  necessary.  
Raymond Williams (1977/1980),  for example,  develops the gramscian concept  of  hegemony and his 
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structures of feeling as a category to study pre-structural changes into society are an interesting tool for  
social sciences that has not been used enough (cf. Randazzo, 2006). In the frame of thought that we are 
at this time concerned, analogical hermeneutics applied to techno-sciences is another option that has 
lately been explored (Coca, 2010).
Conclusion
The cyborg,  in popular culture, it frequently appears as the much-maligned figure of ‘technology out of 
control’, while among academic theorists it heralds an era of emancipatory and transgressive posthuman 
subjectivity. What happens with SI is a bit similar, as they are sometimes focused as a dangerous tool to 
be theorized because it may fall into the hands of the “bad fellows”, or as part of that indispensable move 
needed in social  studies,  which will  brings back the option of  hope and change. Some scholars (cf. 
Cooke, 2006; Law, 2003) seem to alert about the concept of the “human” as a semiotic category that 
serves a normative device, designed to weed out difference, specially because of its ability to incorporate 
new forms of being into its matrix; when to be ‘human’ is to understand and appreciate the mobilities of 
split vision, that is to recognize the privilege of partial perspectives, of balancing and relating different 
realities and versions intertwined.  They may intersect  but  cannot be reduced to  one another.  Social 
Imaginaries might be under this same risk of being co-opted and loosing its potential and strength.
But  as  renegades  in  the  halls  of  subjective  power,  the  cyborg  and  the  SI  are  also  the  unburied 
expectations in the Beck’s society of risk. Fluid, changing, malleable, they remember that the “reality” we  
live in is just one possibility among others. 
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